Written by: Haim Ravia, Dotan Hammer
On September 17, 2026, the Supreme Court, sitting as the High Court of Justice, vacated the decision of the Central Elections Committee for the 26th Knesset that would have permitted party representatives at polling stations to transmit to their parties, in real time, the identities of voters who had already voted.
The practice at issue involves party representatives and observers reporting the names of those who have come to vote; that information is cross-referenced with the voter registry supplied to the parties by the Minister of the Interior under section 39 of the Elections Law — surname, given name, parent’s name, address and identity number of every eligible voter. This would have enabled parties to identify in real time which of their likely supporters have not yet voted and to mobilize them by text message, telephone or a knock at the door.
The Court held that the information at issue is “personal information” under the Protection of Privacy Law as amended by Amendment 13, since it relates to an identified person and constitutes an identifying particular; and it went further, holding that information about the exercise of the right to vote is information concerning a person’s political opinions, religious beliefs or worldview and therefore falls within “information of particular sensitivity” under the statute. Two reasons were given. First, the choice to attend or refrain from attending the polling station embodies a value judgment that may express a worldview — voting is not compulsory in Israel, and abstention may convey non-recognition of state institutions, lack of confidence in the political system, or a sense of not being entitled to influence events.
Second, information about whether a person voted may shape social perceptions of them and expose them to moral opprobrium or social sanctions, particularly where they belong to a group associated with a shared political outlook and represented by a particular party, where abstention may be seen as a betrayal of the group’s values. The Court rejected the argument that the information is not personal because the voter has entered a public democratic process. The information concerns a person inside the polling station itself — “the nuclear core” of the democratic process — which is not a public place in the ordinary sense. The Elections Law prohibits any person from being present there other than the officials required for the proper conduct of the vote.
Regarding its authority, the Court held that the Committee lacked power to take the decision. Infringing a constitutional right of this kind requires specific, clear and express authorization in valid primary legislation; a general authorization, still less ancillary powers, will not suffice, and none exists. The Court underlined the practical consequence: infringement of privacy contrary to the law is a civil wrong and in certain cases a criminal offense. A Committee decision could not shield the representatives who transmit the information, the parties that receive and use it, or the companies that aggregate and manage it, from civil suit or prosecution.
The concurring opinion added that polling committee members, observers and party representatives all act by force of law and perform a public function, ensuring the integrity of the electoral process — and absent express authorization may not use or transmit private information reaching them in that capacity for another purpose; voters must not be put to a choice between exercising their constitutional right to vote and surrendering their privacy.
Click here to read the Supreme Court’s judgment (in Hebrew).
